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This article concerns the role of the private law scholar in New Zealand, and how such scholars use 
their skills to improve the law. It argues that while an obligations scholar's preference may be to 
engage with the courts and other academics in their scholarly activities, a focus on statutory reform 
better suits New Zealand conditions. Scholars should share their talents with policy makers, law 
reform bodies and legislators, helping to explain the importance of a coherent system of private law, 
and how this may be achieved. The authors then go a step further by suggesting that, in the New 
Zealand context, the preferable approach to reform may be one involving policy-based solutions 
exemplified by the accident compensation scheme, as opposed to approaches based on traditional 
private law principles such as party autonomy. 
I A QUESTION OF PRIORITIES 
This article asks how, as New Zealand private law scholars, we can improve the law of this 
relatively small common law jurisdiction. It revolves around two related themes: first, New Zealand 
conditions suggest the prioritisation of reform based on legislation; and secondly, private law 
scholars in New Zealand should engage with the policy-making and legislative process. Having 
settled on such a topic in the context of a collection of articles dedicated to New Zealand private 
law, we have deliberately set out to be challenging. However, we wish to stress that this piece has 
been written with genuine respect for the intellectual ability and dedication displayed by those who 
research and write in this field. We believe that private law scholars have invaluable perspectives 
that should not be lost to the important business of New Zealand law-making, but that being 
involved in that process requires private law scholars to move out of their comfort zone. Our hope is 
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that this brief contribution sparks a response from our private law colleagues, and that through this 
dialogue we may all reflect more deeply on our academic role. 
II "WORLD CLASS" IN NEW ZEALAND 
In developing this piece we acknowledge our debt to Hector MacQueen's (Professor of Law at 
Edinburgh University and a Scottish Law Commissioner) 2013 Willi Steiner Memorial Lecture 
"Invincible or Just a Flesh Wound? The Holy Grail of Scots Law". MacQueen points out the 
difficulties facing a jurisdiction of just over five million people, relying on often old or isolated first-
instance case law for guidance, but with courts facing a steady decline in civil business, a dominant 
neighbouring jurisdiction, and a litigation model that favours high-value cases over legally 
significant ones.1 MacQueen suggests that it is necessary for Scotland to reflect on how it goes 
about reforming its law:2 
One specific lesson which I draw from all these observations is the need, not just to reform the law, but 
also to think hard about the need for doing it by way of legislation or even codification. The difficulty of 
saying what Scots law is in many areas of current concern has borne itself in upon me repeatedly in 
writing national notes for Scotland for European private law publications and even more urgently in 
making contributions to joint projects with the Law Commission of England & Wales. Far too often one 
is left making extrapolations from nineteenth-century or earlier cases or drawing upon isolated (and not 
infrequently unreported) single judge decisions of more recent provenance. If the relatively time-rich 
professor or Law Commissioner finds such exercises problematic, what of the hard-pressed practitioner 
advising clients? The difficulties can be exacerbated by the writers of legal textbooks and treatises 
taking widely divergent views of such authorities as exist in the sources. A code – or quasi-codifying 
statutes in particular area – would at least have the merit of stating authoritatively what the law is, for 
good or ill. And if it turned out to be ill, it could then be reformed with better understanding of what the 
problems for solution are. That is a solution not readily available in a Common Law system.  
MacQueen ended his lecture by imploring his listeners not to try to defend the status quo of 
Scots law, but to respond as well as they could to the "economic, political and social facts of our 
civilisation and make our law fit for consideration as part of the common law of the world".3  
While New Zealand does not have to contend with multiple parliaments and superior courts in 
the way that Scotland must, MacQueen's concerns may nonetheless be echoed in this country. As 
law students in core courses on property, contract and torts repeatedly discover, many aspects of 
New Zealand private law still rely heavily on 18th and 19th century English precedent. Although it 
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is difficult to separate out those cases touching substantively on private law subjects, it seems 
uncontroversial to state that New Zealand's courts are given relatively few opportunities to reassess 
and update these common law authorities. For example, in 2013 there were 296 civil appeals filed in 
the New Zealand Court of Appeal compared with 1,142 appeals filed and 4,291 applications "filed 
or set down" in the Court of Appeal of England and Wales.4 In the most recent statistics available, 
the civil jurisdiction of the New Zealand Court of Appeal saw an 18 per cent decline in the number 
of new appeals filed compared with the previous year: from 296 appeals (2013–2014) to 242 (2014–
2015).5 Given that many of these will be of a public or regulatory law nature, the numbers of cases 
touching substantively on private law doctrines will be low indeed.  
Our purpose here is not to suggest that New Zealand should encourage more civil litigation, or 
otherwise to engage with the civil law "justice gap" highlighted by the Chief High Court Judge in 
late 2014.6 The point raised here is that a common law system relying on case law to develop its 
private law doctrines, especially to meet changing social circumstances, needs judges to have before 
them a staple of fertile material. The Lord Chief Justice of England recently suggested that even that 
jurisdiction's courts were undersupplied with precedent-making cases.7 Private law is too complex, 
and its scope too wide, to be sustained by the efforts of the New Zealand courts alone.  
The familiar answer to this challenge is of course to look abroad; to locate New Zealand's law 
within the common law family and import those developments that this country has not yet been 
able to consider. While we would never dream of rejecting this approach outright, we do wish to 
raise a few increasingly evident difficulties. First, the necessity of doing so makes the law 
inaccessible to the ordinary citizen. Secondly, there are plenty of examples to support the argument 
that England, Australia, Canada and the other common law jurisdictions that New Zealand has 
traditionally looked to for inspiration and guidance are moving increasingly further apart. The 
"Europeanisation" of private law has had a significant impact on the United Kingdom,8 and any 
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New Zealand scholar of conflicts of laws has felt this particularly keenly.9 Both Australia and 
England have reformed their rules on pre-contractual non-disclosure in insurance law, leaving New 
Zealand to apply the original common law tests.10 Even accepting that many areas of common 
ground remain, such a list could stretch across many pages. 
As a result, New Zealand needs to consider, in many situations, the advantages of legislative 
reform over the traditional common law approach to legal development. Others may disagree, and 
press for an approach that promotes a coherent (and internationally applicable) law of obligations.11 
In either case, a preliminary point is that we should not shirk from a consideration of New Zealand 
needs. Not just because our paycheques are largely drawn from the public purse, but because 
research touching on New Zealand law can be of international significance. 
One threat to this kind of endeavour comes in the form of research assessment exercises that 
seem to celebrate the global over the domestic by making the term "international" a byword for 
quality. New Zealand's Performance-Based Research Fund (PBRF) does this by classing an 
academic as "Quality Category B" if they have produced publications of "a high quality" and 
"acquired recognition by peers for their research at least at a national level", whereas a "Quality 
Category A" academic will have publications of a "world class standard" and have "made a 
significant contribution to the New Zealand and/or international research environments".12 Although 
the guidelines are not so blunt as to state that articles in international journals are better than those in 
domestic ones, or that one could not be deserving of "Quality Category A" status with a purely New 
Zealand-based reputation, the implication is clear to working academics: publish often and publish 
offshore. MacQueen similarly observed that there was a sense the United Kingdom government's 
Research Excellence Framework evaluations have turned scholars away from the examination of 
Scots law, on the basis that it might seem parochial and not "world class".13 We are a little 
heartened by recent efforts to broaden the assessment criteria to include impacts on policy.14 
  
9  See Andrew Dickinson "What, if Anything, can Australia Learn from the EU Experience?" in Andrew 
Dickinson, Mary Keyes and Thomas John (eds) Australian Private International Law for the 21st Century: 
Facing Outwards (Hart, Oxford, 2014) 157 at 158–161. Dickinson's comments are equally applicable to 
New Zealand.  
10  Insurance Contracts Act 1984 (Cth); Consumer Insurance (Disclosure and Representations) Act 2012 (UK); 
Insurance Act 2015 (UK); and Jaggar v QBE Insurance International Ltd [2007] 2 NZLR 336 (CA).  
11  See Part III below. 
12  "Quality Category A" and "Quality Category B" as defined in Tertiary Education Commission  
Performance-Based Research Fund: Guidelines for the 2018 Quality Evaluation assessment process 
(Wellington, 2016) at 32.  
13  MacQueen, above n 1, at 5. 
14  See references to policy impacts in connection with "Research Outputs" and "Research Contributions" in 
Performance-Based Research Fund: Guidelines, above n 12, at 46–47 and 56–58. 
 A CRITICAL PERSPECTIVE ON PRIVATE LAW SCHOLARSHIP 433 
Academics' research agendas are of course not purely driven by the six-yearly PBRF cycle, but 
for the ambitious, the pressure to publish internationally is ever-present: "The more senior the level 
of promotion, the more important is publication in international journals and books … relative to 
other forms of scholarly publication."15 With this kind of incentive, private law scholars are well 
placed to focus their efforts on concerns of a more global nature, operating from New Zealand 
without necessarily engaging in its legal landscape. While accepting that this is an option that 
appeals to some, who would argue the international focus of their careers has made them more 
relevant and engaged than they would otherwise be, we urge our colleagues to turn, from time to 
time, to their own backyard for inspiration.  
Private law research focusing on New Zealand issues, whether published in New Zealand or 
elsewhere, can be of "world interest" as well as being "world class". The problems confronting this 
small jurisdiction, and our attempts to resolve those problems (whether through statutory reform or 
case law), are of interest to the outside world, especially when placed in the wider international 
context. In fact the ability to compare and contextualise is one that makes the academic role 
particularly valuable – to show domestic readers where local developments fit within the global 
scheme and to show international readers how a particular jurisdiction is reacting to the challenges 
in question.   
III GLOBAL OBLIGATIONS 
If the pressure to develop an international portfolio is one factor pushing New Zealand's private 
law scholars away from local engagement, another is the move across the common law world to the 
study of the law of obligations.  
As we perceive it, the model of the law of obligations that currently dominates international 
discussion presents private law as an autonomous body, quasi-philosophical in nature that is to be 
evaluated by virtue of coherence and internal consistency. This body of law exists (or should grow 
to exist) within the common law, but usually discussion revolves around an abstract common law, 
removed from any particular jurisdiction. Obligations scholars are working to perfect this body of 
law, drawing on concepts such as party autonomy and private ordering, innate notions of justice 
between private parties and logic.  
Let us take as an example Professor Charles Rickett's article in this volume where he argues that 
to allow the trustee of an express trust to impose by their conduct a beneficial interest in the same 
trust property, leading the court to recognise a constructive trust:16 
  
15  Victoria University of Wellington Academic Staff Collective Agreement – Term: 1 July 2014–30 June 2016 
at 31 under the heading of “Promotion Criteria”. A copy is available at <www.teu.ac.nz>. 
16  Charles Rickett "Instrumentalism in the Law of Trusts: The Disturbing Case of the Constructive Trust upon 
an Express Trust" (2016) 47 VUWLR 463 at 474–475. 
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… is not only instrumentalist and therefore doctrinally incoherent, but it is in fact in itself to sanction 
unjustness. The only interest the trustee can yield is an interest in property belonging to others. That is to 
create a liability in others who may well not be in any way responsible and at the same time to steal 
from some to give to another. It is Robin Hood law. It is the kind of law that exists in some parts of the 
world, like Zimbabwe, but it must not be allowed to creep into New Zealand, no matter how appealing 
the instrumental reasoning that accompanies it might at face value seem. The rule of law is not only a 
signal theme of public law but private law enhances it and is reliant on it. The rule of law is a system of 
justice. It takes rights seriously. When courts start to ignore rights and rule on the basis of intuitions of 
fairness and unconscionability and so on, we move away from justice to regulation. 
Rickett's argument is that the answer to the problem the courts are trying to address, that of how 
to deal with trust property in the wake of relationship breakdowns, could be solved by the common 
law on unjust enrichment with the assistance of private law scholars. By contrast, if the courts 
continue to take the current approach of using trust law to deal with the problem, they will 
destabilise the common law on trusts.17 
His article ends by engaging with the theme of our own:18  
Alternatively, of course, we might want to despair of that possibility and hand the matter over to law 
reform bodies and the Parliament for statutory resolution. It seems that might indeed be a possible 
panacea in New Zealand for the relationship property problem. But whatever we do, creating a shambles 
in the well thought out and case hardened law of trusts is not an outcome we should relish. Indeed, it is a 
prospect that private lawyers in particular should be critically and conscientiously concerned about. For 
soon, if the rot continues, we will have nothing to say because there will be nothing to talk about. 
Rickett's comments neatly encapsulate the strengths of the obligations model and what it has to 
offer. The ability to take a broad view of private law, analyse perceived attacks on its doctrinal 
coherence, and suggest better avenues for the problems at hand – all within the scope of the 
common law. Furthermore the justifications for those doctrines are not blindly supported by 
reference to precedent, but by reference to philosophical justifications about how private law and 
society should interact. But what we suggest is that, rather than handing over such matters in despair 
to law reform agencies or Parliament, it ought to be our role not only to actively engage with these 
institutions' projects, but also to help set their agenda. In this way we can make them the more likely 
agents than the courts to deal with the problems that changed circumstances present for the law.  
Law reform is not what we do when we give up thinking, it is rather the point of thinking in the first 
place. 
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IV IMPROVING NEW ZEALAND'S PRIVATE LAW 
We do not suggest for a moment that there is no value in the kind of scholarship exemplified by 
Rickett and other prominent academics. Instead our hope is that New Zealand's private law scholars 
will take the time to share their skills with New Zealand's policy makers and legislature to help 
improve this jurisdiction's law; to follow research articles through with suggestions for reform, 
engage in the consultation process when policy or legislative projects are underway, and not to rely 
solely on the accretion of case law. 
In general terms, we argue that statutory reform is the better means of private law reform. The 
law becomes more accessible, is given the imprimatur of Parliament (which is best placed to decide 
on any policy issues that arise), and enables a broad view of a problem to be taken as opposed to the 
haphazard and piecemeal nature of common law developments. We accept that an obligations 
scholar might object and suggest that private law is best left alone – that it can fulfil its social role 
and develop without the meddling of politicians. However, we are sceptical of suggestions that the 
common law of obligations, left to its own devices and informed by scholarly debate, leads to the 
best outcomes for those whom the law is supposed to serve. 
One major advantage of the legislative approach to reform in the New Zealand context is that 
the question of what the law is has a clear starting point. In areas not covered by legislation, such as 
the tort of negligence, New Zealand lawyers must keep an eye on developments in England and 
elsewhere, and then attempt to guide their clients by surmising the probable approach of a New 
Zealand court if confronted with a similar issue. Will the New Zealand courts follow the foreign 
judgment's line of reasoning? What if there is a conflict between the law of Australia and England, 
for example, and both approaches have their merits? This links back to MacQueen's concerns about 
the difficulties of a legal system relying on case law, but producing so few civil cases (especially 
ones that progress to final judgments on legal points). For example, it was a long five year wait for 
New Zealand between the decision in Henderson v Merret Syndicates and the confirmation of New 
Zealand's position on concurrent actions in contract and tort in Turton v Kerslake.19 
New Zealand's building liability cases, starting with Invercargill City Council v Hamlin in 
1994,20 paint a similar picture. Did New Zealand really start out on a different conception of how 
such cases are to be resolved or simply apply the law to "New Zealand facts"? It has taken several 
Supreme Court decisions in recent years to clarify the position in the wake of the leaky building 
crisis.21  
  
19  Henderson v Merrett Syndicates [1995] 2 AC 145 (HL); and R M Turton & Co Ltd (in liq) v Kerslake and 
Partners [2000] 3 NZLR 406 (CA).  
20  Invercargill City Council v Hamlin [1994] 3 NZLR 513 (CA).  
21  See for example North Shore City Council v Body Corporate 188529 [2010] NZSC 158, [2011] 2 NZLR 
289 [Sunset Terraces]; North Shore City Council v Attorney-General [2012] NZSC 49, [2012] 3 NZLR 341 
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Sometimes a statute might be a better means of resolving an issue than analysing the issue from 
a private law perspective. Take an example from the world of credit repossession, where a practice 
developed for a power of attorney or agency clause to sometimes be added to a credit contract. The 
repossession agency might then use this power to add additional goods to the list, taking more than 
had apparently been agreed to (this was despite possible private law obligations that doing so might 
have been a breach of the purpose for which the power was given).22 This practice was abolished by 
statute in 2014.23 The public policy interest of consumer protection was necessary to overrule the 
private ordering between two parties with a significant power imbalance.  
The kind of undertaking we are describing here can be achieved without sacrificing the 
principled commitment of the obligations scholar to doctrinal coherence and the common law 
method. Taking the trust example referred to above, the government (whether in the guise of the 
Law Commission, a ministry or Parliament itself) should be told how the courts have gotten it 
wrong to date and, crucially, why this is a problem from a private law perspective and how it can be 
resolved. Private law scholars are uniquely placed to do this and there is no sense in sitting on the 
side lines if a reform project is underway that touches on a private law scholar's area of interest, only 
to later criticise the outcome in a learned article.  
We now outline two caveats in relation to this preferred approach. First, successfully engaging 
with legislative reform is difficult. Secondly, the type of reform that New Zealand needs will, in our 
view, often depart from an obligations scholar's notion of a good legal solution.  
A  We Need to be Better at Arguing for Change, or the Status Quo 
While we would argue that the statutory route is the better one, legislative reform in areas 
covered by obligations scholars will often struggle to gain public policy traction in the responsible 
government departments or political traction with Ministers.  
This creates challenges for private law scholars in New Zealand. It is important that we 
articulate – much better than is currently done – why consistent and coherent private law is 
important to New Zealand as matter of public policy. In our view, a very good claim can be made 
that a modern and efficient private law is a key part of a country's legal infrastructure. That might 
seem self-evident to academics in this field, but it is not always self-evident for those used to 
evaluating proposals by reference to evidence-based policy protocols. Those responsible for this 
process might struggle with generalised philosophical claims that law reform is unnecessary because 
  
[The Grange]; and Body Corporate No 207624 v North Shore City Council [2012] NZSC 83, [2013] 2 
NZLR 297 [Spencer on Byron]. 
22  Law Commission Consumers and Repossession: A Review of the Credit (Repossession) Act 1997 (NZLC 
R124, 2012) at 33. 
23  Credit Contracts and Consumer Finance Amendment Act 2014, s 51.  
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it would create injustice between two hypothetical contracting parties, for example, when they have 
been asked to address what has been framed as a social problem confronting thousands of 
individuals. 
Private law scholars should therefore be prepared to learn how the policy-making process works 
and engage with it, as opposed to waiting for submissions to select committees, when the core issues 
and the chosen approach have already been established. After all, government policy-making 
processes are becoming more accessible, with exposure drafts of bills and public submissions called 
for during the policy creation stage more frequently. Rather than seeing such engagement as a 
distasteful watering-down of the scholarly mission, this ability to exercise the skills of modern, 
practical reform should be celebrated – and successful engagements rewarded professionally. And 
surely it is more satisfying to look back and say "I was partly responsible for that statute", than to 
say "I wrote an article criticising that statute the week after it was passed"?  
But what if a scholar decides that statutory reform is unlikely to pass the basic thresholds 
required by evidence-based policy, or senses that the matter will never make it on to the legislative 
agenda? This is clearly the case in some areas of private law (reform of maritime liens seems 
distinctly unlikely in the near future,24 for example), and we do not suggest that statutory reform is a 
global panacea. However, in such cases, we should be more reluctant to end articles with the 
conclusion that although a particular case is unjust it cannot be changed except by Parliament. 
Instead we should urge the New Zealand courts to bite the bullet and accept that they should get on 
with the reform process itself as best they can. This was ultimately the experience in New Zealand 
in relation to Parliament's repeated failure to reform the limitation regime before the final passage of 
the Limitation Act 2010, for example. In such situations private law scholars can assist the judiciary 
by making clear the case for reform and the options available, and providing support for what the 
judge might then try to do with the common law resources available.  
B Different Models of Legislative Reform  
If a private law scholar accepts that legislative reform is necessary to correct a problem in New 
Zealand's private law, they may be thinking of a reform through which Parliament uses a short 
statute to nudge the common law back on track. New Zealand's statute book features a series of 
contract law statutes (notably Frustrated, Illegal, Mistakes, Remedies and Privity)25 through which 
the uncertainties of the common law have been circumvented by legislative clarifications, fix-ups 
and workarounds. These examples might not have been enacted in pursuit of public policy goals that 
differ significantly from the priorities of contract law scholars generally, but they do demonstrate 
the power of legislation to take the confusion out of a problem created by the common law process. 
  
24  Fournier v The ship "Margaret Z" [1999] 3 NZLR 111 (HC) at 119. 
25  Frustrated Contracts Act 1944; Illegal Contracts Act 1970; Contractual Mistakes Act 1977; Contractual 
Remedies Act 1979; and Contracts (Privity) Act 1982.  
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By and large they have been a success, even if the theoretical baggage with which they were passed 
has been disputed.26 Similar comments could be made in relation to the various tort law reform 
statutes. Indeed, these are now such a familiar part of the established legal firmament that it is often 
forgotten that the survival of tort claims after death, comparative (as opposed to contributory) 
negligence, and contribution amongst joint tortfeasors are all the creatures of statute rather than 
common law.27 
To this extent, we hope to have taken most private law scholars with us, at least as far as 
accepting that statutory reform can have a legitimate role in private law reform, and that the skills of 
academic lawyers can be put to good use when such statutes are being cooked up. Where we are 
likely to part company with a number of them is in proposing that, for New Zealand conditions, the 
best approach to reform will often lean heavily on public policy concerns, and at times depart 
radically from the common law. With this approach the private/public divide in law falls away to a 
large extent, as lawmakers search for pragmatic solutions to problems based on policy goals such as 
the protection of consumers or the facilitation of commerce. Core obligations-type concepts such as 
fairness between parties or the predictability of results can be bargained away (sometimes 
unintentionally) in this process, or considered from different perspectives.   
The classic example of this approach is the Woodhouse Report (50 years old next December) 
that led to New Zealand's accident compensation scheme.28 The right to sue was removed and the 
policy goal of a common response to personal injury by accident was inserted in its place. Issues 
like party autonomy, corrective justice or the restoration of private relations that dominate the way 
that obligations scholars often now speak of tort law29 were not as dominant in the scholarship then, 
but if they had been they would probably have been seen as somewhat beside the point. The point 
was that the common law simply could not, and indeed cannot, provide the kinds of compensation 
and rehabilitation that social policy demands as the response to accidents. 
Another example with a wide scope of application is the Personal Property Securities Act 1999 
(PPSA), in relation to which New Zealand emulated North American initiatives that have since 
  
26  See for instance the debate between Professors McLauchlan and Sutton over the degree to which the 
Contractual Mistakes Act 1977 was intended to remake the fundamental nature of what amounts to an 
agreement: DW McLauchlan "More on the Contractual Mistakes 'Code'" (2003) 9 NZBLQ 51; and Richard 
Sutton "The Code of Contractual Mistake: What Went Wrong?" (2003) 9 NZBLQ 234. 
27  Law Reform Act 1936; Law Reform Act 1944; Contributory Negligence Act 1947; Death By Accidents 
Compensation Act 1952; Domestic Actions Act 1975; and Defamation Act 1992.  
28  AO Woodhouse, HL Bockett and GA Parsons Compensation for Personal Injury in New Zealand: Report of 
the Royal Commission of Inquiry (December 1967). 
29  See for instance the work of Ernest J Weinrib The Idea of Private Law (revised ed, Oxford University Press, 
Oxford, 2012); or Allan Beever Rediscovering the Law of Negligence (Hart, Oxford, 2007).  
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spread to Australia.30 This model promotes the provision of credit terms to businesses by 
introducing a simplified ranking of priorities based on straightforward statutory criteria combined 
with a register of interests. In exchange, the common law concept of title to goods is pushed aside. 
The New Zealand case of Graham v Portacom New Zealand Ltd, in addition to being the first 
reported decision on the Act's provisions, provides a stark example of its operation.31 Portable 
cabins were loaned to a company that ran into financial troubles. The registration provisions of the 
PPSA were not complied with. The failing company's creditors moved in and, under the PPSA, had 
a higher-ranked claim to the cabins than Portacom as the cabins' owners. The private ordering 
between Portacom and the failed company, and the individual injustice of a company having its 
property seized to satisfy the debts of another, were subsidiary to the interests of a clear system that 
can quickly be learned and applied by non-lawyers throughout the business world.  
Finally, and accepting that it will never be as famous as Sir Owen's triumph of law reform, the 
humble Carriage of Goods Act 1979 affects the majority of New Zealanders each week, especially 
in this age of online shopping. By creating a codified liability regime and limiting virtually all 
claims for loss or damage during domestic carriage to $2,000,32 the Act's success can be measured 
in the lack of amendments it has undergone in the years since its introduction,33 despite the wide 
range of industries it serves. The age-old difficulties of determining fault in the transport context are 
stripped away – along with older common law concepts such as the common carrier34 – in exchange 
for a simplified strict liability system.35 
There are also pieces of legislation that engage less directly with the common law, but instead 
introduce a new angle of approach that bypasses its complexities. For instance, the Fair Trading Act 
1986 takes the concept of "misleading or deceptive conduct in trade" and expands on it to proscribe 
a variety of undesirable practices.36 A variety of remedies is available, including orders to pay 
damages, refund money or return property, vary contracts, supply goods and so on.37 The Act is a 
common sight in New Zealand pleadings, and extends to disputes between commercial parties.38 
  
30  Roger Fenton Garrow & Fenton's Law of Personal Property in New Zealand (7th ed, LexisNexis, 
Wellington, 2010) vol 2 at ch 2; and Personal Property Securities Act 2009 (Cth). 
31  Graham v Portacom New Zealand Ltd [2004] 2 NZLR 528 (HC).  
32  Carriage of Goods Act 1979, s 15. 
33  Ports of Auckland Ltd v Southpac Trucks Ltd [2009] NZSC 112, [2010] 1 NZLR 363 at [1]. 
34  Carriage of Goods Act 1979, s 28. 
35  Ports of Auckland Ltd, above n 33, at [2]–[4]. 
36  Fair Trading Act 1986, s 9.  
37  Section 43.  
38  A Westlaw NZ case search for references to the legislation since its enactment returns close to 5,800 hits.  
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Faced with its broad notions of fairness and its flexible collection of remedies, why would a legal 
advisor not suggest adding it to the list of causes of action, rather than tangling with potentially 
complex common law actions and remedies? The relatively short Act cuts through a wide range of 
complexities on the strength of the policy of promoting fairness in trade. But the Act is also an 
example of an area that could do with much more attention from private law scholars, who might be 
better equipped than others in properly exploring what coherence and consistency in the law might 
mean for the metes and bounds of the Act. A similar comment could be made for impact of the 
Resource Management Act 1991 (and local government law in general) on the law of nuisance and 
other land-related aspects of tort law.39 
V PRIVATE LAW SCHOLARS HAVE MUCH TO OFFER 
The public policy-driven model of statutory reform could be seen as a threat to the dominant 
model of obligations scholarship.  Clearly reforms like ACC deliberately advance the policy goal 
chosen over the values of autonomy or coherence that private law scholars might favour. Public 
policy will sometimes seem to cheerfully mix criminal and public law concepts into its legal 
formulae if these are seen as the most appropriate mechanisms, and the means of reform will almost 
inevitably involve messy legislative compromise. For example, a large bank might be prepared to 
forgo justice in individual cases in exchange for a law that is easy to comply with when applied to 
thousands of customers, preferring to use electronic systems and a high degree of automation to 
save resources overall. Similarly two insurance companies might prefer to take a "knock for knock" 
approach to settling claims, rather than trying to determine the extent to which each company's 
insured driver was actually liable for a car accident.  
But we think that this sense of threat is misplaced, and simply rejecting what the public policy 
wonks want to do as impure is a waste of much of the private law scholar's learning and insights. In 
fact the very values, insights and skills that private law scholars bring to their work are often those 
that are most needed in the turning of policy objectives into effective, quality legislation. The 
private law scholar might fear that their insights and skills would be wasted at this level of detail, 
and more suited to abstract theoretical discussions about the law that might later filter down into 
legislative change. However, if private law scholars fail to engage with this process, or do not 
engage in a way that those running the process will understand, then they miss the opportunity to 
shape the outcomes of those reforms. At the very least, we are not convinced that writing for 
common law practitioners and judges alone will be as effective a means of reform as writing for 
policymakers and legislators. We think this is true even when the public policy goal might 
contradict the conclusions that a private law scholar might draw as the solution to a particular 
problem. It is our belief that autonomy and coherence remain important objectives of the way in 
which policy reforms are enacted. We are both fans of the broad Woodhouse approach but we also 
  
39  See for example Antoinette Besier "Leaving it all to the Resource Management Act 1991: The Demise of 
the Private Tort of Nuisance" (2004) 35 VUWLR 563. 
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both believe that the way in which that vision is enacted could greatly benefit from more rigour, and 
from the insight of the common law into some of the more difficult problems that it needs to 
solve.40  
Returning to the themes discussed in connection with MacQueen's article above, it seems that 
New Zealand is failing to engage in significant areas of common law development; most notably the 
law of restitution and the role of unjust enrichment that has proceeded apace in the English courts 
since the early 1990s,41 but which (with some notable exceptions) has passed most New Zealand 
lawyers by. The notion of developing a cohesive common law approach to restitution within the 
current New Zealand framework will be very difficult, if not impossible, to achieve. By contrast, a 
Law Commission inquiry followed by statutory reform might not provide a perfect solution to every 
problem, but it would at least provide a timely starting place. Private law scholars should be 
convincing government and policymakers to make this kind of project a priority.  
Alternatively, by turning to the question of how legislative reform might improve New 
Zealand's private law, scholars in this country could engage in areas that have been sadly neglected 
of late, such as the accident compensation regime. Academic lawyers can bring value to discussions 
of fairness under the Fair Trading Act, on the importance of private ordering in the context of 
contract law reform and on the role of personal responsibility in the context of a "no fault" scheme 
of compensation. 
VI  CONCLUSION: BEING A SUCCESSFUL NEW ZEALAND 
PRIVATE LAW ACADEMIC  
What does success look like for a New Zealand private law scholar? A DPhil at Oxford, a 
presentation at Obligations IX and an article in the Law Quarterly Review? All of these are 
wonderful achievements, but some contribution to New Zealand law must surely also be rewarding. 
And while any private law scholar can identify areas for improvement in the law, the challenge in 
our view is to make one's analysis count in New Zealand – to achieve reform, or to educate those 
who make the decisions about reform that private law counts too. We would be the last to suggest 
that the kinds of deep thinking, and writing, that questions the direction of the law, or interrogates 
those who seek to change it or to use it for their own purposes is not valuable; indeed it is essential. 
But what we would argue is that as scholars we should also be concerned about insisting on our 
relevance in the law-making process.  
In this article we have argued that to make itself relevant, private law scholarship needs to be 
translated into the "real world" of 21st century New Zealand law. We all write for different 
  
40  See for example Geoff McLay "Accident Compensation – What's the Common Law Got to Do With It?" 
[2008] NZ L Rev 55; and Bevan Marten "ACC's Cover Provisions Need a Makeover" [2016] NZLJ 223. 
41   See generally Graham Virgo The Principles of the Law of Restitution (3rd ed, Oxford University Press, 
Oxford, 2015). 
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audiences at different times, and sometimes a theoretical piece is precisely what is needed, as for 
example during the early stages of an emerging common law doctrine.42 But from time to time we 
should lift our eyes from the pages of black letter law and see what others are doing outside of the 
academic sphere. This is not a zero-sum game; one does not have to decide between the Law 
Quarterly Review and providing value to New Zealand law. We can, and should, be trying to do 
both. The policy and legislative process may conjure up images of Bismarck and sausages, but New 
Zealand conditions dictate that it is the most effective means of change.  
  
42  See for example Nicole Moreham "A Conceptual Framework for the New Zealand Tort of Intrusion" (2016) 
47 VUWLR 283.  
